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This paper intends to survey the meaning of corporatism (section 1), the foundations of 
corporatist policies and institutional substitutes for it (section 3), the evolution through 
time of corporatism, from its golden days (section 2) to its practical demise in more 
recent years (section 4). It also raises the issue whether a future is to be expected for it 
(section 5, which concludes the paper). 
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1. CORPORATISM, SOCIAL PACTS AND INCOMES POLICY. 
 
Corporatism (or neo-corporatism) is an ambiguous concept, which 
has been defined by economists, political scientists or sociologists in a 
variety of ways, in some cases in relation to the different analytic orientation 
or the specific purposes of the inquiry. If we focus on the process involved in 
corporatism, we can define it as ‘an institutional arrangement that involves 
negotiation, bargaining, collaboration and accord between major economic 
groupings in the society, in particular business and unions, usually involving 
also governments.’ This largely corresponds to definitions of corporatism in 
Cameron (1984), Bruno, Sachs (1985), Burda (1997) and is the same as 
Cubitt’s ‘Corporatism 4’ (Cubitt, 1995). It stresses the nature of ‘the rule of 
the game’ that could help to set up an encompassing organization à la 
Olson (1982), capable of overcoming the social costs due to existence of a 
prisoner’s dilemma. Other definitions can refer to the number of existing 
unions (the degree of centralisation of wage setting) or to the values of their 
objectives or the weights put on them (Cubitt, 1995). 
Corporatist arrangements usually take the form of social pacts. 
These differ from the collective bargaining involved in bilateral negotiations 
between business and labour, even when such negotiations refer not only to 
wages, but also to employment levels, labour organisation, etc.. Social 
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pacts require direct or indirect participation also of other, mainly public, 
institutions, which makes the outcome of negotiations more complex and 
interesting (Regini, 2001). Social pacts are a form of institutional incomes 
policy. They seek to instil cooperative industrial relations, by establishing 
appropriate institutional mechanisms that aim at changing the nature of the 
competition (or game) between the various income recipients. This can be 
done by introducing an explicit requirement for cooperation or, in any case, 
by imposing a cooperative solution like arbitration or by engaging in an 
economic or political exchange. The underlying idea is that income 
distribution should not be decided by the market. On the contrary, 
consensual policies must be shifted from the market sphere into the political 
agenda, as Tarantelli (1986, 1987) claimed. At this level distributional 
conflicts can be set as part of economic and social policies, in such a way 
as to bring about a better macroeconomic performance.  From a number of 
points of view social pacts can be considered as being a part of – or a 
complement to – the Keynesian-like institutions and policies implemented 
after WWII. 
 
2. THE GOLDEN DAYS OF CORPORATISM  
 
While different forms of incomes policy have been implemented 
since World War II, when in Anglo-Saxon countries some governments 
introduced a sort of wage and price freeze, social pacts have been adopted 
only later. They were extensively stipulated mainly in European countries 
and, to some extent, in all the other Continents since the 1960s, when 
labour markets began being ‘tight’, as a consequence of Keynesian policies 
and protracted high employment. In the United States, the Kennedy 
administration introduced voluntary wage and price guidelines in 1962. In 
1956, following a previous sort of judicial procedure, a Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission began to operate in Australia. Together with 
regional commissions it set the minimum terms and conditions of 
employment and dealt with unfair work dismissals. Australia also developed 
a kind of ‘social agreement’. In 2005 the wage setting powers of the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission were largely transferred to the 
Australian Fair Pay Commission. Austria had (and still has) a centralised 
bargaining structure, the Parity Commission for Wages and Prices, in which 
the government, unions and firms participate on equal footing. In France, as 
part of the 'V plan' in 1964, it was decided to consider wage and price 
problems explicitly. The prospect of a high rate of growth of national income 
was offered in return for wage moderation. In the United Kingdom between 
1948 and 1950 the Labour government negotiated a voluntary wage 
restraint with the trade unions. Later, between 1974 and 1979, an attempt 
was made to draft a ‘social contract’ between trade unions and the Labour 
government. The unions were granted a role in the formulation of economic 
policy – especially industrial relations legislation – in exchange for wage 
moderation. In Scandinavian countries, unions were stronger than 
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elsewhere long since and industrial relations were thus less dependent on 
the state, but a number of tripartite formal or informal agreements were 
developed (and are still in force), not only in the realm of labour relations but 
also in other fields, such as social and environmental issues, less so in 
Sweden than in Denmark and Norway (Lindvall, Sebring, 2005; Mailand, 
2008).  
 
3. WHY A COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT? SUBSTITUTES TO CORPORATISM.  
 
As theorized by Tarantelli (1982, 1986, 1987), corporatism is a form 
of centralized representation of the interests of business, unions and the 
government capable of dealing with income distribution better than the 
market. Government intervention through taxes, services, etc. is essential 
for reconciling the dual nature of wages as cost to firms and income for 
workers. While contributing to the draft of social pacts, the government 
should also make credible plans for pursuing macroeconomic stabilisation 
and growth, by means of a consistent set of instruments, including the 
dynamics of wages agreed to through social pacts.  
As said, corporatist agreements usually involve some kind of wage 
moderation, in exchange for the promise, especially, of higher employment 
and lower inflation or provision of public goods and services by the 
government (‘economic exchange’). Sometimes, compensation takes the 
form of general policy attitudes reflecting on other relevant aspects of 
common life, such as environment protection or civil rights safeguard and 
the like (‘political exchange’).  
The main compensation needed by the unions in reward for 
moderation of nominal (and, ultimately, of real) wages can be assurance of 
a high employment level. The amount of compensation depends on a 
number of institutional and political factors. These influence the extent of the 
conflict of interests opposing the unions to business and the government 
and the existence and extent of forms of implicit compensation or of 
substitutes of social pacts.  
The factors on which implicit compensation depends (i.e., union’s 
inflation aversion and partisanship) and its substitutes (i.e., government or 
central bank conservatism) are important in order to reduce the cost of 
social pacts to the unions deriving from wage moderation (and thus the 
amount of explicit compensation required). They also affect the costs and 
benefits of the other actors involved.  
The costs of social pacts to unions can be reduced (or eliminated) 
by their inflation aversion. Unions  might dislike inflation for a number of 
reasons. They may be concerned about the effects of inflation on variables 
different from real wages and employment or output, such as other incomes 
and financial investments not protected against price rises, fiscal drag, loss 
of competitiveness, risk of devaluation, etc. The unions’ inflation aversion 
has been of the utmost importance in some countries (e.g., Germany) for 
the whole period after WWII, not only for some of these reasons (in 
  
particular, protection of unindexed incomes and competitiveness) but also 
for historical reasons. In the last two decades unions’ inflation aversion has 
played an important role in other countries as well, particularly in Europe in 
conjunction with the need for disinflation related to fulfilment of the 
Maastricht criteria.  
Partisan unions
1
 might ensure moderation of wages simply in order 
to support the general political programme of the government or a politically 
affine government. Thus partisanship too could help to explain social pacts 
in the absence of explicit compensation, in countries where the other 
substitutes for compensation do not operate. However, in some cases, as in 
Germany in the 1970s, partisanship can have added to the unions’ 
demands (Streeck, 2006).    
Conservatism, i.e. a higher weight put by the central bank on 
inflation relatively to unemployment, is usually a substitute for side 
payments to unions or even for corporatism
2
. In fact, corporatism can be 
thought of as an institutional device alternative to conservative monetary 
policies and the monetarist recipe for ensuring macroeconomic stability 
(mainly price stability, and also employment).  
The conservative central banker has characterized the discussion 
on macroeconomic stabilisation at least starting the early 1980s. The central 
idea of advocates of central bank conservativeness since Barro, Gordon 
(1983) is to create a credible commitment to a non-inflationary policy – 
eliminating the inflation bias. The possibility that conservativeness can really 
improve the economic performance is not without opposition (see e.g. Skott, 
1997; Lawler, 2001).  More recently, among others, Soskice, Iversen (1998, 
2000) and Coricelli, Cukierman, Dalmazzo (2006) have shown that a 
conservative central banker can be beneficial also because he eliminates 
negative wage externalities in decentralized wage-setting systems. 
However, the conservative central banker is only an imperfect substitute for 
the lack of union coordination and wage centralization is a Pareto superior 
solution (Jerger, 2002; Acocella, Di Bartolomeo, Tirelli, 2007).   
The conservative central bank can be thought of as a kind of ‘forced’ 
cooperation to settle the conflict between the union, on the one side, and 
business and the public sector, on the other, but – as said - is often not the 
best solution. A conservative central bank in a monetary union with active 
trade unions is indeed sub-optimal in the absence of fiscal coordination 
(Acocella, Di Bartolomeo, Tirelli, 2007). This institutional arrangement is, 
however, the kind of solution to the conflict chosen by designers of the 
institutional architecture of the European monetary union. This choice might 
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have found some inspiration from the economic literature of the 1970s and 
early 1980s, but the founding fathers of EMU appear also to pursue other 
goals than simple macroeconomic stability. One such goal could be that 
they wanted to settle the conflict over income distribution through monetary 
policy trusting that a small change in unemployment could effectively 
discipline wage claims. This was indeed the solution chosen in Anglo-Saxon 
countries in the 1980s. In other contexts, as in some Mediterranean or 
Scandinavian countries, such an option could not work due to the unions’ 
resistance and social pacts or collective agreements were stipulated that in 
most cases avoided macroeconomic instability, at least in the short run, 
while having no pronounced effect on income distribution. Another 
explanation of the partial transfer to the EMU level of German conservative 
institutions only, and not of other German institutions (such as corporatist 
ones), could be that choice of other institutions was left to member 
countries, possibly with the idea that in any case they should care for 
keeping the German pace. Eventually, concertation in Germany could have 
played the role of an instrument for ‘regime competition’ within the Union, as 
it was indeed the case.  
 
4. THE WEAKENING OF SOCIAL PACTS 
 
The world of Keynesian-like institutions and policies implemented 
after WWII slowly deteriorated since the end of the 1970s. This was also so 
for social pacts. The 1980s were marked by a general and powerful thrust 
towards decentralisation, which was especially evident in the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Ireland and Spain, with a reduced capacity of 
drafting incisive agreements.  
At first sight, the 1990s brought a reversal of trends as a result of the 
increasing occurrence of national agreements and tripartite social pacts, 
formally, as in Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal and Spain, 
or informally and on a more continuous basis, as in Austria and the 
Netherlands. Failed attempts include Belgium, Germany, France, whereas it 
is not easy to classify the attempt to forge an ‘Alliance for Jobs, Training and 
Competitiveness’ in Germany after the change in government in 1998 (see 
also Bispinck, Schulten, 2000). However, pacts stipulated in the 1990s and 
in the following years (‘second generation social pacts’) appear to differ from 
the earlier ones in at least one important respect. They established wage 
moderation or reduction against reductions – rather than increases – in 
public expenditure and government action to protect employment and 
labour rights (Regini, 1997; Visser, 2002). This may be thought of as the 
consequence of new occurrences taking place, first in relation with the neo-
liberal attack to Keynesian-like policies and institutions emerged in the 
1980s in the United Kingdom and the USA. It was also the consequence of 
the specific requirements set by the Maastricht criteria for taking part to 
European Monetary Union and ensuring a smooth transition from a planned 
to a market economy of formerly Socialist countries, on the one hand, and 
  
of the increase in competition deriving from globalisation, on the other. A 
kind of ‘competitive corporatism’ (Rhodes, 1998) thus emerged, specifically 
in European countries as a way to face the challenges of the monetary 
unification, the transition, economic integration and globalisation.  
Altogether, after the demise of the Bretton Woods regime, these 
events changed the kind of economic, social and political model that had 
ruled in the thirty years or so after WWII, based on Keynesian policies, the 
welfare state and national neo-corporatism.  
The balance of political power had shifted against labour because of 
direct and indirect competition from foreign labour. Then unions began 
suffering a loss of confidence among their constituencies, lost militancy and 
had to accept new (lower) bargaining levels and standards.  
Business too faced the new challenges of foreign competition in 
product markets. However, it also saw new opportunities deriving from 
access not only to these markets but also to foreign labour markets. This 
contributed to weaken it from the constraints of the neo-corporatist game. In 
fact, as Streeck (2006: 20) notes, business had never been enthusiastic 
about institutionalized tripartism, perceived as a vehicle for organized labour 
to insert itself in the centre of economic policy-making and to impose 
constraints and encroachments on managerial prerogatives. According to 
Streeck (2006: 20), tripartite cooperation was accepted by the business 
class for reasons of political expediency as a second-best solution, or as the 
lesser evil compared to unbridled shop-floor militancy. They were ‘afraid of 
political interference, in a “negotiated economy”, with their freedom to invest 
or not to invest; and increasingly believed, rightly or not, that labour and the 
democratic national state were responsible for what they experienced as an 
exacerbating profit squeeze.’  
  
4. A FUTURE FOR CORPORATISM? 
 
 The decline of corporatism is thus tied to globalisation and 
competition between workers across countries. Business can easily play 
one country’s workers off other countries’ by moving products and capital 
from one place to another. In a historical perspective, ‘competitive 
corporatism’ has been an attempt to fill new wine in an old bottle, but seems 
to have finally led the regulatory institutions of capitalism to a state of torpor.  
Reflecting on the fact that these institutions were born when the 
playing field was common to the constituent parts of corporatism, within the 
nation state, a possible way out could derive from finding a new common 
playing field, at a wider, international level. This would require globalisation 
of labour and government. It is, however, not an easy prospect to build 
upon, not only because there are difficulties in globalisation of labour (as 
some past experiences have shown)
3
, but also as even more difficulties 
                                                 
3
 However, recently the International Trade Union Confederation has been established 
and global union federations have been reformed (Evans, 2010). 
 8 
 
arise on the side of global public governance. Compounding at a global 
scale the interests once (and to some extent still) represented or mediated 
by national governments would be even more difficult than the already 
difficult task of representing and mediating the interest of labour and 
business at this level. Doing the same at a regional, e.g. European, level 
might have a higher chance of feasibility. In any case, for specific issues or 
to face specific contingencies national social pacts can certainly continue to 
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